Tichý and Fictional Names by Glavaničová, Daniela
 © 2017 The Author. Journal compilation © 2017 Institute of Philosophy SAS 
Organon F 24 (3) 2017: 384-404 
Tichý and Fictional Names 
DANIELA GLAVANIČOVÁ1 
ABSTRACT: The paper examines two possible analyses of fictional names within Pavel 
Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The first of them is the analysis actually pro-
posed by Tichý in his (1988) book The Foundations of Frege’s Logic. He analysed 
fictional names in terms of free variables. I will introduce, explain, and assess this anal-
ysis. Subsequently, I will explain Tichý’s notion of individual role (office, thing-to-be). 
On the basis of this notion, I will outline and defend the second analysis of fictional 
names. This analysis is close to the approach known in the literature as role realism (the 
most prominent advocates of this position are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Gregory Currie, 
and Peter Lamarque).  
KEYWORDS: fictional characters, fictional names, roles, Transparent Intensional Logic, 
variables. 
1. Introduction 
 The semantic analysis of fictional names is one of the central topics in 
the (analytic) philosophy of fiction. This issue is closely related to the on-
tology and metaphysics of fictional characters, or more broadly, of fictional 
entities. By fictional names I will understand expressions that seem to be 
introduced in order to speak about fictional characters. Fictional names will 
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thus be expressions such as Sherlock Holmes, Toru Watanabe, Thérèse 
Raquin, Jean-Sol Partre etc. I will confine my attention to such individual 
fictional names, leaving aside fictional names of other sorts (e.g., names of 
fictional cities, events, bridges, schools and so on). Moreover, the focus 
will be on the literature, leaving thus aside movies, music, fine arts and so 
on. 
 Since Pavel Tichý and his Transparent intensional logic (TIL) will be 
central for this paper, let me briefly introduce him and his work. Pavel 
Tichý was a Czech logician and philosopher who developed TIL, a frame-
work for the analysis of natural languages (but also for the analysis of lan-
guages in general). Tichý has laid the foundations of TIL in his The Foun-
dations of Frege’s Logic (see Tichý 1988). The goal of TIL was ambitious 
from the very beginning: Tichý claimed his system not only to correct the 
shortcomings of Frege’s theory (hence the title) and of Russell’s theory, but 
also to be the right medium for modelling our whole conceptual scheme 
(see Tichý 1988, ix). The proposed system is hyperintensional.2 Tichý 
models meanings as structured procedures (constructions; see Tichý 1988, 
56-65). Any well formed expression of TIL represents a construction (def-
initions of constructions can be understood as determining the syntax of 
the language in passing). Moreover, the system is fundamentally functional 
(even sets are understood primarily as characteristic functions) and these 
functions are partial (so a function can be undefined for some arguments). 
Every entity of TIL has its logical type (cf. Tichý 1988, 65-66). In sum, 
TIL is a hyperintensional partial lambda calculus with types. Most tech-
nical details of TIL are unimportant for this paper, so I will stop here for 
the time being. 
 Of course, one can ask: Why Tichý? Why this complicated system of 
TIL? Let me briefly motivate the project: First, Tichý sketched an inter-
esting suggestion for an analysis of fictional names worth of further  
exploration. Indeed, this will be one of the aims of this paper. Second, 
Tichý extensively discussed so-called individual roles (offices, things-to-
be) that have been also extensively discussed in the current TIL. One of 
the positions occurring in the literature concerned with the semantics of 
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fictional names is the so-called role realism.3 Though it is not an aim of 
this paper, I think that a comparison of the roles as understood by Tichý 
and the roles as understood by role realists might be fruitful. Third, a new 
cousin of the role realism can be formed using roles as understood by 
Tichý. I will outline and motivate such account, though, it shall be noted 
that I will not offer a comprehensive exposition and defence here. Fourth, 
fictional names are often thought to be non-referring (empty) expressions 
(see Braun 2005). TIL is partial, so emptiness is something that is not a 
problem for an advocate of TIL. Fifth, there are various issues concerning 
fictional names that call for a more sophisticated theory of meaning, or 
to say it frankly, that call for hyperintensionality. Again, I will stop here. 
I hope this suffices for the reader as an initial motivation. 
 A short note on methodology: I will treat the theories of fictional names 
as providing us with semantic models. For instance, when I suggest to 
model fictional characters in terms of individual roles, I am not thereby 
suggesting that we should identify fictional characters with individual 
roles.4 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: First, I recapitulate Tichý’s rea-
sons for denying certain sort of descriptivism of fictional names. I further 
introduce and explain his analysis of fictional names in terms of free vari-
ables (section 2). Subsequently, I assess his analysis (section 3). I then ex-
plain his account of individual roles (section 4). I use Tichý’s roles to 
sketch and motivate an alternative account of fictional names (section 5). 
The account is close to descriptivism, but it does not amount to the sort of 
descriptivism that Tichý criticised. The final section 6 anticipates and dis-
cusses some objections that can be directed to the approach suggested in 
the section 5. 
                                                          
3  The most important role realists are Nicholas Wolterstorff, Gregory Curie and Peter 
Lamarque; see Wolterstorff (1980), Curie (1990) and Lamarque (2008; 2010). 
4  Note that this approach allows me to abstract from some properties of the “real 
thing”; cf. Bielik, Kosterec & Zouhar (2014, 112) and Bielik (2012). 
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2. The first analysis: fictional names as free variables 
 The main aim of this section is to introduce and explain the analysis of 
fictional discourse suggested by Pavel Tichý. The analysis of fictional 
names was proposed in Tichý (1988); more precisely, it was merely 
sketched there because the whole account is explained on four pages (keep 
in mind, however, that the account presupposes the whole framework of 
TIL, as developed and defended in the book). Though some points may 
seem outright suspicious to the reader, I will postpone the assessment of 
the theory to the next section.  
 When we use fictional names, Tichý claims, we “seem to name partic-
ular entities and yet are unable to say which entities they are” (Tichý 1988, 
261). Because of this, fictional reference is for him a case of so-called un-
specified reference. How to account for fictional reference, then?  
 Tichý starts with showing us how an analysis should not look like: the 
section begins with the criticism of Fregean descriptivism of fictional 
names, thus paving the way for Tichý’s own account.5 He mentions several 
problems faced by a descriptivist: 
 1. The choice problem: It is not clear how to extract essential features 
that should be incorporated in the sense of a fictional name such as Sher-
lock Holmes. If one suggests that we should incorporate every single de-
tail mentioned in any of these stories that would mean that one could not 
understand the first story before finishing the last. If one suggests that 
each story gives the name its own sense that would mean that one could 
not understand the first sentence of the story before finishing the last sen-
tence. 
 Even if we suppose that we have somehow managed to extract such 
essential features from the Holmes stories as a whole (e.g., Sherlock 
Holmes is said to have the same sense as the pipe-smoking detective), there 
will still be many difficulties (see Tichý 1988, 262). 
                                                          
5  Tichý attributes the view directly to Frege, and discusses it only in the context of 
Frege’s work. However, the analysis of fictional discourse was not central for Frege (he 
was repeatedly trying to put it aside). Moreover, the position goes under the caption 
descriptivism of fictional names in the current literature. I will thus speak directly of 
descriptivism. 
388  D A N I E L A  G L AVAN I ČOV Á  
 2. The problem of different truth-conditions: The sentence Sherlock 
Holmes played the violin can be true even if it does not hold that the pipe-
smoking detective played the violin (i.e. if it was not true that there was 
exactly one pipe-smoking detective and that he played the violin). The truth 
of the sentence with relevant description is not necessary for the truth of 
the corresponding sentence with a fictional name. Moreover, even if there 
was exactly one pipe-smoking detective, it would not follow that Sherlock 
Holmes is his name and that Doyle was writing about him. This is the fa-
mous Kripke’s objection to descriptivism of proper names.6 In general, this 
means that the truth of the sentence with relevant description is not suffi-
cient for the truth of the sentence with the fictional name in question. These 
sentences have different truth-conditions, so the relevant description can 
be hardly understood as a good analysis of the given fictional name. 
 3. The attitude problem: Tichý considers as a most troublesome dif-
ficulty for descriptivism the attitude the reader is supposed to take with 
respect to the thought expressed by the sentence containing fictional 
name – what sort of attitude it should be? Tichý claims that readers nei-
ther believe nor pretend to believe that the thought in question is true. 
However, readers nevertheless make some inferences concerning fic-
tional names. 
 The above criticism motivates the introduction of Tichý’s own account. 
This account can be summed up as follows: 
 1. Fictional names are analysed in terms of free variables. 
 2. Tichý’s two-dimensional theory of inference (inspired by Frege and 
Gentzen) is used for the analysis. 
 3. The logical analysis is provided in terms of TIL. 
Note that this is not the way how Tichý actually put forth his approach. 
Nevertheless, I think that the summary captures all crucial ingredients of 
his analysis. 
                                                          
6  Kripke (1972, 157) expressed the objection as follows: “The mere discovery that 
there was indeed a detective with exploits like those of Sherlock Holmes would not 
show that Doyle was writing about this man.” 
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 Example: A simple example will provide an explanation of these three 
requirements. Consider the overused sentence Sherlock Holmes is a detec-
tive. In the first-order logic, the most standard analysis will be simply D(s), 
where s is an individual constant and D is an individual predicate. I now 
gradually amend this analysis:7 
 1. D(x) 
 2. D(x) / D(x) 
 3. [0Dw x] / [0Dw x]8 
 Explanation: 
 1. The first amendment captures Tichý’s requirement to analyse fic-
tional names in terms of free variables. It can be understood as a case of 
logical form in the first order logic.  
 2. The second amendment incorporates Tichý’s two-dimensional the-
ory of inference. How to read this? One can find two readings in Tichý 
(1988, 263, 264), but it is not entirely clear which is the preferred one. First, 
one can read it as follows: for any individual, if the individual is a detective, 
then this individual is a detective (Tichý 1988, 263). Second, one can read 
it also in the following way: for any valuation, if the D(x) is true under this 
valuation, then D(x) is true under this valuation. 
 3. Finally, the third amendment comes with TIL analysis. I will not 
explain the whole foundations of TIL here (as mentioned above, one can 
find it in Tichý 1988, 56-66). However, I will explain this particular exam-
ple. What is new in 3 is the construction [0Dw x]; it is an abbreviation of 
[[0D w] x]. This construction contains two free variables: w (for possible 
worlds) and x (for individuals). Not surprisingly, variables are also  
constructions. 0D is a construction called trivialisation. It takes the object 
                                                          
7  Again, proceeding in these ʻstepsʼ is a heuristic device that will help me to explain 
the analysis without explaining everything from the preceding more than 260 pages of 
the book. 
8  This construction is abbreviated. I explain it below. Also, Tichý would include var-
iables for time-moments, so, more precisely, his analysis would be [0Dwt x] / [0Dwt x]. 
However, since time-moments will be unimportant for the present discussion, I omit 
them to make the presentation simpler (and more comprehensible). 
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D and returns the very same object, the property of being a detective (a 
function from possible worlds to sets of individuals, where a set of individ-
uals is understood as a function from individuals to truth-values). The 
brackets stand for the construction called composition. To put it simply, 
composition [0D w] consists in executing the construction 0D, thus obtain-
ing the abovementioned mapping, executing w to obtain an argument of 
this mapping, and applying the mapping to the argument constructed by w, 
thus obtaining a function from individuals to truth-values (a set of individ-
uals). Finally, the whole [[0D w ] x] consists in applying the latter mapping 
to the argument constructed by x, thus obtaining a truth-value. 
 However, up to this point, I omitted one important issue: “As a variable 
itself, a construction containing a variable may construct one entity relative 
to one valuation and another entity relative to another” (Tichý 1988, 62). 
The promiscuous nature of free variables makes it the case. Because of this, 
constructions containing free variables are, in some sense, not self-suffi-
cient, not independent, incomplete – open. Open construction is a TIL-ver-
sion of the logical form from the first order logic.9 
 Of course, it is also needed to say which variables are free according to 
Tichý; (the definition is to be found in Tichý 1988, 73-74). In general, 
bound variables are of two sorts: variables bound by trivialisation and var-
iables bound by λ operator (again, a new notion: to put it simply, λ helps 
us to generate functions by abstracting from particular values of argu-
ments). Free variables are, quite straightforwardly, variables that are not 
bound. 
3. Assessing the first analysis 
 Let me now assess the analysis explained in the previous section. I, 
again, proceed along the three ‘steps’ introduced above. To begin with, I 
sum up some of its advantages. After that, I summarize some of its disad-
vantages. The list is not be exhaustive, but I mention the points that seem 
to be of the uttermost importance. 
                                                          
9  For more on the notion of logical form, see Duží & Materna (2005). 
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 The first step safeguards the unspecified reference of fictional names 
(i.e., that a fictional name does not refer to a particular individual). Im-
portantly, this requirement also assures that though fictional names do not 
refer to particular individuals, if the fiction contains (syntactically) differ-
ent fictional names, they can be differentiated also at the level of semantics. 
This is so because they are analysed in terms of different free variables. For 
example, the sentence Watson is a friend of Sherlock Holmes can be (pre-
liminarily) analysed as F(y, x).  
 The importance of the above point stems from the fact that TIL involves 
so-called objectual theory of variables. This theory of variables assures that 
two variables are simply two different objects, they are not undifferentiated 
gaps.10 
 Because of this feature, the problem of co-identification, formulated by 
Stacie Friend, is avoided as well (see Friend 2014). This problem consists 
in the fact that when different people use the same fictional name, they 
seem to be talking about the same fictional character. However, antirealists 
about fictional characters maintain that there are no fictional characters – 
how to explain the seeming co-identification, if nothing is identified? Yet 
it was suggested that it is a problem for realists, too. Be it as it may, Tichý’s 
theory does not lead to this problem: If one has two fictional names, one 
has two free variables. 
 As Raclavský repeatedly indicated, the analysis also nicely captures 
how we read or write fiction in the initial stages, when we have neither a 
complete list of properties ascribed to a fictional character nor a complete 
list of relations between various fictional characters (see Raclavský 2009; 
2015). Note also that this feature makes the theory a good candidate for a 
realist position resistant to some of the Everett’s worries concerning the 
initial stages of creating a work of fiction (cf. Everett 2013, sec. 7.4).  
                                                          
10  Compare this with the Gappy Proposition Theory, for instance, the one formulated 
and defended in Braun (2005). David Braun struggled with the problem of differentiat-
ing between ‘gaps’. The sentence Holmes is a detective seems to mean something dif-
ferent from what the sentence Watson is a detective means. Braun was trying to avoid 
descriptivism of fictional names, so these sentences are bound to express the same 
gappy proposition. His suggestion was to speak about different ways of believing. In 
this case, we can differentiate between ʻHolmes-ishʼ and ʻWatson-ishʼ ways. But how 
can one understood or formally model these different ways (while still avoiding de-
scriptivism)? 
392  D A N I E L A  G L AVAN I ČOV Á  
 Tichý motivates the second step as follows: “the reader of a fictional 
story is occasionally expected to draw inferences from what the text ex-
plicitly says” (Tichý 1988, 264). However, anything of the form A / A is a 
logical truth. Hence, it will be probably useful to invoke an analogy with a 
logical or mathematical system.11 Tautologies of the system are logically 
true in one system, but may be untrue in another. Similarly, sentences of 
the fiction are true in one fiction, but may be untrue in another.12 
 The third step allows us to take on board all the advantages of TIL – 
hyperintensionality, partiality, types, and so on. I do not recapitulate all the 
advantages of TIL here, since the reader can easily see it just by scanning 
the work done in the current TIL.13 
 Let me now turn to disadvantages. First, it is not clear how the choice 
problem (which Tichý attributes to descriptivism) is avoided: Which con-
structions should be taken as inputs for reader’s inferences?14 And which 
logical, conceptual, or factual background assumptions are presupposed? 
Tichý does not seem to be counting with any factual assumptions, though 
these are needed for some obvious inferences (see Lewis 1978). 
 As regards the second step, a sentence with a fictional name amount 
under this analysis to a trivial logical fact. Tichý anticipates complaints 
(since works of art do not seem to be composed of logical facts) and de-
fends his account in the following way: “But this is hardly an objection to 
it as a construal of Doyle’s sentence. One does not turn to fiction to learn 
anything new. If one wants to learn, one had better reach for a book on a 
non-fiction shelf” (Tichý 1988, 263).  
                                                          
11  Tichý seems to be approaching towards such an analogy (cf. Tichý 1988, 262-263), 
and it would facilitate the defence of his approach. But he does not venture far enough: 
maybe his objectual, realist stance on logic is behind this reticence (see the Preface in 
Tichý 1988, or the first chapter thereof for evidence). Yet by venturing too far I am not 
inviting the reader to abduce my views on logic. 
12  Recall the ʻIn fiction Fʼ operator from Lewis’ (1978) crucial paper. 
13  E.g., see the contents of Duží, Jespersen & Materna (2010) or Raclavský (2009). 
14  One of the reviewers did not agree that the choice problem is a problem for Tichý’s 
analysis, suggesting that we should take as an input simply those that can be seen as 
meanings of the sentences of the respective stories. But a role realist can employ the 
very same strategy. The choice problem cannot help us in deciding between Tichý’s 
original approach and a version of role realism based on TIL (see Section 5). 
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 I disagree. We learn something even when we read novels – we learn 
about the content of the relevant novel (e.g., a literature student can use this 
knowledge afterwards – during tests, exams, while writing a paper, for a 
research in the field of literary criticism, etc.).15  
 While the sentence Sherlock Holmes was a pipe-smoking detective en-
tails that Sherlock Holmes was a pipe-smoking detective is not informative 
(e.g., for a reader, for a literary critic), the sentence Sherlock Holmes was 
a pipe-smoking detective is informative. When we find such sentence in the 
Holmes stories, we indeed learn something about the content of the work, 
about the character of Sherlock Holmes, etc. Therefore, while I agree that 
Sherlock Holmes was a pipe-smoking detective entails that Sherlock 
Holmes was a pipe-smoking detective “does not represent an interesting 
piece of knowledge”, I do not agree that it is not an objection to Tichý’s 
account. Indeed, it is an objection to his account as a construal of Doyle’s 
sentence Sherlock Holmes was a pipe-smoking detective, since this sen-
tence is in some sense informative – in a sense in which Tichý’s analysis 
of this sentence is not. 
 Furthermore, novels often contain some factual claims, personal view 
and attitudes of the author, some moral or aesthetic judgements etc. (con-
sider any deeply personal novel, for instance, Bukowski’s Ham on Rye; if 
the movies were included, Woody Allen would give us a plenitude of good 
examples). Many novels are also partly based on historical events and are 
describing real people (for example, consider the novel about Gödel and 
his wife, The Goddess of Small Victories, written by Y. Grannec). 
 Another serious trouble was suggested by one of the anonymous re-
viewers. Variables are always proper (a variable is evaluated under every 
valuation). Therefore, Tichý’s analysis counts as a realistic one. How to 
read nonexistence claims then? It is not easy to see how this account could 
possibly make sense of sentences such as “Sherlock Holmes does not ex-
ist”. 
 Also, whilst free variables may be plausible candidates for explaining 
the initial stages of writing / engaging with some fiction, they do not seem 
                                                          
15  Sometimes we even learn new factual information, since writers often use real cit-
ies, real events, and write true things about them. Yet the sort of information I had in 
mind is more closely related to the notion of analytic information as employed in Duží 
(2010). 
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as plausible candidates for things we love, hate, admire, etc., when we take 
some emotional attitudes towards works of fiction. 
 Jiří Raclavský has mentioned another worry in one of his papers (see 
Raclavský 2007), namely that it is not always clear whether the given name 
is fictional or not. For instance, how can one know whether some name 
occurring in a certain novel is a proper name of a real person (not described 
in the novel with a historic accuracy) or a fictional names of a fictional 
character (based or modelled on some real person)? Yet this problem is 
probably not specific to Tichý’s account. 
 These were the most serious advantages and disadvantages of Tichý’s 
analysis. Let me now proceed towards an alternative account, an analysis 
in terms of Tichý’s notion of individual roles. 
4. Tichý’s individual roles 
 In section 2, I have sketched Tichý’s reasons for denying certain sort of 
descriptivism of fictional names. However, definite descriptions that a de-
scriptivist uses to analyse fictional names are, indeed, very similar to un-
specified reference. Consider a case when one uses a definite description, 
e.g., the president of France. This description does not explicitly mention 
any specific individual who occupies the French presidential office. Fur-
thermore, there are cases when one uses a definite description and is not, 
for good reasons, able to tell the reference: e.g., when seeking who the 
murderer is. Moreover, there are cases when a definite description neces-
sarily does not have a referent – consider the famous Quine’s example of 
the round square cupola on Berkeley College. 
 Tichý devoted much attention to the analysis of definite descriptions. 
He analysed them in terms of his notion of an individual role (office, 
thing-to-be). The plan of this section is to explain his account of these 
individual roles. Tichý’s most extensive exposition of this notion is to be 
found in his Individuals and Their Roles (see Tichý 2004a).16 Intuitively, 
                                                          
16  The first version of the text appeared in his unpublished manuscript The Introduc-
tion to Intensional Logic from 1976 (in English). It was reworked and published in 1987 
(in German), its Slovak translation was published in 1994 and finally, the English trans-
lation was published as Tichý (2004a). I quote from the (2004a) version. 
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an individual office is something an individual can be: for instance, the 
description the president of France changes its extension as time goes by. 
The president of France denotes something that an individual can be – an 
office, a role.  
 There are several important features of individual offices that need to 
be mentioned here:  
 1. Roles have requisites: A requisite is “what it takes for a material 
object to hold that office” (Tichý 2004a, 717). For instance, “the property 
of being a king is a requisite of the office of King of France, such that every 
occupant must have the relevant property” (Duží, Jespersen & Materna 
2010, 128).17 
 2. Roles have properties: the President of France is an eligible office; 
the President of France exists (is occupied), the King of France does not 
exist (is not occupied). 
 3. Roles are abstract entities: they are not to be confused with individ-
uals actually occupying them (if there are any). 
 4. Roles can be occupied by different individuals at different possible 
worlds and times. 
 5. Roles may be indeterminate: “A thing-to-be … may be largely inde-
terminate as to physical properties … A thing-to-be, i.e., an office occupiable 
by material objects is not the sort of thing which might conceivably have 
a weight, precise or vague” (Tichý 2004a, 716-717).  
 6. Roles can be unoccupied: “Given a thing-to-be, it may happen that 
nothing is it; it may happen that there is no such thing… nothing even re-
motely similar can be said of a material body” (Tichý 2004a, 716). 
 7. Roles are objects on its own right, so one can quantify over them. 
 8. Roles are given, or determined by certain constructions. If one in-
vokes the Fregean sense and reference distinction,18 one can say that these 
                                                          
17  Surely, this is just an intuitive explanation, not a precise definition. See section 6 
where I discuss this notion more extensively. 
18  Fregean, not Frege’s. Frege used these terms differently. He did not employ con-
structions in the first place. Also, the reference was for him usually an extensional en-
tity. Here the constructions represent sense and intensions reference. What is borrowed 
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constructions are senses of definite descriptions and roles are their refer-
ence. 
 9. One can also have various attitudes to these roles, or to constructions 
determining these roles; moreover, one can talk about these roles (or con-
structions denoting them) and compare various roles, talk about their prop-
erties and requisites, etc. 
 Interestingly enough, Tichý mentions the fictional name Sherlock 
Holmes in the discussed paper. He considers the sentence Sherlock Holmes 
does not exist and asks: “whom do I deny existence of? Sherlock Holmes, 
i.e., a person? Hardly. As is well known, none of the persons in the world 
is Sherlock Holmes. It thus appears that … I deny existence of nothing at 
all” (Tichý 2004a, 720). Afterwards, he writes that the same goes for his 
new Rolls-Royce when saying My new Rolls-Royce does not exist (the lat-
ter was analysed in terms of roles). However, his new Rolls-Royce is a role 
– what about Sherlock Holmes? Moreover, though Duží, Jespersen & Ma-
terna (2010) agree with the first analysis proposed by Tichý (fictional 
names as free variables), they analyse the name Santa Claus in terms of 
roles (see Duží, Jespersen & Materna 2010, 90-92). Yet the name Santa 
Claus seems to be similar to the name Sherlock Holmes. In this paragraph, 
I was just trying to show that the possibility to analyse fictional names in 
terms of roles is not entirely extraneous to TIL. Let me now explore this 
possibility. 
5. The second analysis: fictional names as individual roles 
 A closer look at the characteristics of roles 1-9 from the preceding sec-
tion reveals that it may be promising to use this account of roles for the 
analysis of fictional names. Indeed, this is something what I will do in this 
section. Let me start with the following proposal: 
Fictional names should be analysed in terms of individual roles (as 
characterised in the preceding section). However, these individual 
                                                          
from Frege is just the metaphorical understanding of the sense as a way of giving the 
reference.  
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roles are necessarily non-occupied (empty). As it is with the other ex-
pressions, we can pronounce a fictional name to speak about its sense 
(a construction), about its reference (a role), or about its extension 
(which, as it should be clear, does not exist). 
I follow the characteristics 1-9 and explain their usefulness for the  
analysis: 
 1. Requisites are helpful in analysing the properties ascribed to fic-
tional characters by the authors, such as Sherlock Holmes is a pipe-smoking 
detective: If there was someone fulfilling the role of Sherlock Holmes, this 
entity would be a pipe-smoking detective. It is literally true that a role of 
Sherlock Holmes has this requisite: it does not matter that the office of 
Sherlock Holmes is not occupied. A similar strategy can be used for ascrib-
ing many other properties as requisites for being that fictional character 
(weight, height, age…).19 
 2. Properties are useful for the analysis of sentences such as Sherlock 
Holmes is a fictional entity or (the character) Sherlock Holmes is famous. 
A quite tough sentence Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle can 
be analysed thanks to properties of roles as well. Intuitively, the creation 
of Sherlock Holmes consists simply in the fact that Doyle picked an ex-
pression or introduced a new one for his character and chose some initial 
properties. This can be captured as a role property of being firstly described 
by Doyle. This is, of course, a sort of creation in the spirit of role realism 
(cf. Wolterstorff 1980; see also the distinction between characters per se 
                                                          
19  I won’t go into details here, but this is not the only reading of such sentences that 
we can get. If we employ de dicto and de re distinction, as I surely would do in a more 
comprehensive exposition of my views, we can distinguish: 
 (i)  Sherlock Holmes (de dicto) has a requisite (= first order property)… 
 (ii)  Sherlock Holmes (de dicto) has a (second order) property… 
 (iii) Sherlock Holmes (de re) has a (first order) property… 
The sentences of the form (i) and (ii) can be literally true, if the role of Sherlock Holmes 
has the respective requisite (e.g., being a pipe-smoking detective) or the respective 
property (e.g., being a famous fictional character or being non-occupied), whilst no 
sentence of the form (iii) will be true, since there is no “res”, no occupant of the Sher-
lock Holmes office. 
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and fictional characters in Lamarque 2010, 201), which would not satisfy 
all theoreticians.20 
 3. The fact that roles are abstract entities makes them intersubjective. 
From the ontological point of view, it is important that this approach does 
not postulate any new entities (roles are needed also for the analysis of non-
fictional discourse). In addition, roles are no queer entities; they are baked 
from the very same ingredients as properties or relations. It can be seen that 
this approach adopts a middle way between realism and irrealism (as un-
derstood in Sainsbury 2009). It is not a genuine realist approach, since it 
does not claim that there is a ʻrobustʼ Sherlock Holmes (occupying the in-
dividual office of Sherlock Holmes); and it is not a genuine irrealist ap-
proach, since individual offices are abstract entities (but are no more ʻex-
oticʼ than numbers and sets). 
 4. The fact that roles can be occupied by different individuals is not 
important here, since these roles are necessarily empty.21 
 5. Indeterminacy is crucial, since fictional characters are not described 
completely. 
 6. The fact that roles can be empty is crucial too: since there are no 
entities named by fictional names, there is no real Sherlock Holmes. This 
is important for the non-existence claims, such as the claim that Holmes 
does not exist.22 
 7. The possibility of quantification over fictional characters is im-
portant for the analysis of sentences such as Many characters occurring in 
Murakami’s novels are sad. The same goes for sentences comparing dif-
ferent fictions. 
                                                          
20  For instance, Amie Thomasson, an abstract artifactualist, criticised this way of ap-
proaching the authorial creation; see Thomasson (2009). 
21  Currie (1990) would not agree with this point (see section 6). 
22  One of the reviewers claimed that there could be only one trivialization of necessary 
empty role in TIL, so every fictional name would have the same meaning. It depends 
on the identity criteria of constructions in general and constructions of necessarily 
empty roles in particular. I do not see any obstacle in differentiating between different 
(constructions of) empty roles on the basis of their requisites. E.g., the meaning of 
Holmes is different from the meaning of Watson, because the requisites for being 
Holmes differ from the requisites for being Watson. 
 T I C H Ý  A N D  F I C T I O N A L  N A M E S  399 
 8. Constructions are important here for many reasons, but the most cru-
cial one is this: Since the reference of a fictional name is a necessarily 
empty role, one needs something to differentiate between various empty 
roles. This falls within the competence of constructions. They can embody 
the ʻHolmes-ishʼ and ʻWatson-ishʼ ways of believing, in an exact way. 
 9. We sometimes hate, love, pity, envy or simply think about fictional 
characters. All these are attitudes. It is thus desirable that this approach can 
acknowledge this issue. Who do girls love, when they love, for instance, 
Mr. Darcy? Surely not some real, full-blooded entity, since (unfortunately) 
there is no such entity. They love a fictional character. All they have is a 
fictional name, a bunch of words describing this fictional character, the 
respective bunch of meanings, and probably also corresponding imagina-
tion of the fictional character. Yet my imagination of Mr. Darcy is surely 
not identical to him, since it is subjective, and not intersubjective. An in-
tersubjective entity is needed if we want to make sense of sentences such 
as “Many girls love Mr. Darcy” or “There is a fictional character that many 
girls love, namely, Mr. Darcy.” 
6. Possible objections 
 The first difficulty, and perhaps the most serious one, is the already ex-
plained Kripke’s objection (see footnote 5 of this paper). I am not willing 
to bite the bullet (as Currie partly does in his 1990, 180) and say that I can 
be Sherlock Holmes. Nor I am willing to say that there can be Sherlock 
Holmes, since as I understand the expression “Sherlock Holmes”, if it 
stands for anything, it stands for that fictional character from Doyle stories. 
As Kripke maintained, even if someone very similar happened to exist, it 
would still not suffice for saying that Doyle was writing about this man 
(similarly, if a winged horse-like creature appeared, it would not suffice for 
saying that Pegasus is real after all). If someone asked us where the grave 
of Sherlock Holmes is, we would see it either as a joke or as a terrible 
misunderstanding. Under the supposition that Sherlock Holmes cannot ex-
ist Kripke’s objection is easily avoided as soon as there is something block-
ing the occupation in the case of the actual existence of an individual sat-
isfying all the properties explicitly ascribed to the fictional character by the 
author of the fiction in question. As I formulated the analysis, fictional 
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characters are necessarily empty roles. However, a precise formulation of 
the role property blocking the occupation is still needed. 
 Whether we accept the supposition that the role of Sherlock Holmes 
is necessarily empty or not, I maintain that this issue needs to be resolved 
before the actual analysis can start. We need to know whether some term 
is a fictional name (a name of a purely fictional character) or a genuine 
individual proper name (a name of a real person). Since fictional charac-
ters are not real individuals, this matter is of semantic significance (under 
the supposition of Millianism). And the resolution may be sensitive to the 
purpose of the subsequent analysis (see below the answer to the choice 
problem). 
 A related objection pertains to the notion of requisites. As Miloš 
Kosterec has reminded me several times, if fictional characters are mod-
elled in terms of necessarily empty roles, requisites cannot be defined as 
Duží, Jespersen and Materna suggest in their (2010, 361-362), for every 
property would be a requisite of such roles. This is a serious worry, but 
there are some options how to deal with it. One option is to take Currie’s 
route (mentioned above) and admit that it is possible that there was real 
Sherlock Holmes (indeed, one of the reviewers was suggesting precisely 
this). Another option is to use definitions of requisites from the above book, 
but change the material implication for some other sort of implication. A 
further option is to treat the notion of requisites as primitive. Finally, my 
preferred option is to define the requisites in terms of the content of the 
respective work of fiction. Note, however, that there are principal reasons 
why the essential properties cannot be defined once and for all: identity of 
fictional characters is interest relative, and so is the extent of their essential 
properties (again, see below). Also, note that the issue of determining req-
uisites would then be closely connected to another task, that of determining 
truth in fiction (see Lewis 1978). 
 Another worry is the choice problem. I am sympathetic to the reply 
along the lines of Lamarque (2010, 200) who argues that “fictional charac-
ters are initiated types, grounded in acts of story-telling, i.e. fictional nar-
ratives, although not essentially bound to anyone, even if tied to a reason-
ably determinate historico-cultural context. Their identity is interest-rela-
tive depending on demands placed on their identity conditions, which in 
turn determine the extent of their essential properties.” If one aims to com-
pare Sherlock Holmes from Doyle stories to his counterpart from modern 
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Holmes series, it may be useful to treat them as different fictional charac-
ters. If one aims to compare Holmes to other fictional detectives, it may be 
useful to treat old and modern Sherlock Holmes as one character. If one 
judges Grannec’s novel as a biography about Kurt Gödel, no differentiation 
between the real and the fictional Gödel is made, and if something false is 
said about him, it may be properly said that Grannec made a mistake. On 
the other hand, if we read the piece just as a novel, the real Gödel is distin-
guished from the fictional one, and it makes no sense to criticize Grannec 
for making the fictional Kurt different from the real one. I think that this 
sort of sensitivity is widespread, it exists in reality and needs to be acknowl-
edged by theories of fictional characters. 
 Furthermore, by opting for a role-based analysis of fictional names, one 
is either denying the claim that all proper names are directly referential 
expressions, or one is denying that all fictional names are proper names. 
 I prefer the latter. For most, however, it is not even an option to question 
the status of fictional names as proper names (cf. Friend 2014). On the 
other hand, some would opt precisely for this suggestion: “We should not 
start by assuming that fictional names are genuine proper names. We need 
to know more about fictional names and proper names before we can de-
cide whether they are” (Currie 1990, 128).  
 Let me now consider these two options. Direct reference theory of 
proper names says that proper names refer to individuals irrespective of 
the properties exemplified by these individuals. It is a plausible, intui-
tively appealing view, enjoying the great popularity. Woody Allen would 
have been Woody Allen even if he had not directed Annie Hall and even 
if he had not been a director at all. His name is due to naming conven-
tions, not the facts of his life. On the other hand, it seems that fictional 
names are not directly referential. Follow my simple line of reasoning: to 
begin with, take an arbitrary fictional name (say, let us pick again the 
overused Sherlock Holmes). First, if Sherlock Holmes fails to refer, it is 
not a directly referential expression (since it is not a referential expres-
sion). Second, if this expression refers (in the sense that it has an exten-
sion), this extension must be a tall man, a detective, must live at the Baker 
Street, and must have properties explicitly ascribed to him. So, in this 
case, it is again not a directly referential expression (it refers, but not 
directly). Be it as it may, this expression is not a directly referential ex-
pression. 
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 The above thoughts motivate the following: no fictional name is di-
rectly referential, but all genuine proper names are directly referential. 
This entails that fictional names are not proper names, so the unity is lost.  
 Is that a problem? I don’t think so. Yes, the syntactic form of fictional 
names suggests that they belong to the family of proper names. But there 
is also a considerable dissimilarity between the way fictional names func-
tion in the language and the way genuine proper names function in the lan-
guage (even ignoring the above claim that fictional names are not directly 
referential). For instance, if one wants to name a child, one has an individ-
ual given in advance, and one wants to name this given individual. This is 
not the case in fiction. The author chooses an expression that will serve as 
a fictional name and some initial properties that will be ascribed to the 
character – though there may be some mental idea of this fictional character 
given in advance, but this idea is not identical to this character – the char-
acter is not yet born. Moreover, there are considerable differences in the 
identity conditions. While no individual is identical to another individual 
(numerical identity), the case of fictional characters is not that strict. Recall 
the quote from Lamarque (2010, 200) saying that identity of fictional char-
acters is interest relative. Nothing remotely similar can be said of individ-
uals and their proper names. 
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